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Near the end of his life, john Wesley proposed that propagation of the message of 
entire sanctification was the chief reason why God had raised up his Methodist 
movement.' Whatever one makes of this claim to providential purpose, the doctrine 
of Christian Perfection clearly became the focus of Methodism's most vigorous early 
debates, both with opponents and within the movement. Nowhere were the internal 
debates more polarized than among North American Methodists. Partisan factions 
emerged in the early nineteenth century, dividing on a spectrum that ran from denial 
of any need for or possibility of entire sanctification to insistence that it was a state of 
Christian victory that could be entered instantaneously by any believer (however 
young in their Christian life) who simply claimed it in faith. 
There have been several attempts to account for this divergence among Wesley's 
American descendants. Some have ascribed it primarily to the impact of incompati-
ble temporal variations in Wesley's views on entire sanctification that are reflected in 
the materials he bequeathed to his movement.' Others (who often assume more 
consistency to Wesley's own understanding) highlight tensions between his teach-
ings on Christian Perfection and those of some of his co-workers and early follow-
ers.' The question that either of these suggestions leaves is how the character and 
dynamics of the early Methodist experience in North America may have itself con-
tributed to divergence over the issue of entire sanctification. In one of the first con-
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siderations of this question, John Peters attributed deviation from Wesley's understanding 
to a (claimed) omission of his Plain Account of Christian Perfection from American 
Methodist publication and influence in the crucial years of 1812-32.5 A more widely 
held suggestion is that the Enlightenment optimism and stress on individual human liberty 
that permeated culture in the new United States of America made it increasingly difficult 
to maintain the traditional Protestant assumption of original sin-the eradication of which 
was (supposedly) Wesley's defining purpose for entire sanctification.6 In some contrast, the 
other major proposal is that the alien influence of subtly Reformed models of 
divine/human interaction in sanctification heightened the tendency of the "holiness" wing 
of American Methodism to equate Christian Perfection with the event of the "baptism of 
Holy Spirit," thereby accenting its instantaneous character at the expense of growth-in 
significant contrast from Wesley.' 
While there is much that is helpful in these various suggestions, I have become con-
vinced that there was another significant factor involved that has not received due atten-
tion. Put briefly, early American Methodists decisively (though, initially, without recogniz-
ing it'l abandoned Wesley's basic understanding of how humans make moral choices and 
enact them (i.e., his "moral psychology") for a very different model. On the terms of this 
new model, Wesley's central emphases concerning sanctification and Christian Perfection 
no longer made sense or held together. As a result, his American descendants were left to 
fight over fragments of their heritage, or to tum elsewhere for views more congenial to 
their adopted moral psychology. 
To develop this suggestion, I will need to outline Wesley's assumptions about moral 
psychology and their connection to his understanding of sanctification. I will then tum 
attention to the abandonment of this moral psychology in American Methodism. Finally, I 
will suggest how this change helps account for the debates over entire sanctification 
among Wesley's American descendants. I believe this process will put us in an enlighten-
ing position to reflect on what lessons we might learn from this American Methodist saga 
about the dynamics of spiritual growth and the possibility of Christian Perfection. 
I. WESLEY'S "AFFECTIONAL" MODEL OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION 
Let me begin with some observations about Wesley's eighteenth-century British 
context.8 Early Anglican moral thought was dominated by an "intellectualis(' model, where 
virtue was a matter of reason suppressing the distractions of the (irrational) passions to 
enable morally free and correct acts of will. This reigning model was aggressively chal-
lenged in the eighteenth century by the empiricist tum in English philosophy. For empiri-
cism truth is something experienced receptively by the human intellect, not imposed by it, 
or simply preexistent within it. In relation to moral psychology, this philosophical convic-
tion led to the insistence that the human will can likewise be moved to action only by 
being experientially affected. While intellectual assessment of the conditions and conse-
quences of a proposed course of action may take place, personal action will ensue only if 
the "affections" are also engaged, inclining the person toward the action. 
This emphasis on the indispensable contribution of the affections to human action 
was not limited to philosophers in eighteenth-century England. It found strong advo-
cates as well among theologians seeking to counteract the emerging deistic reductions 
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of religion to mere reverence for the truths of natural revelation and reason. One of 
the strongest voices arguing that reason alone was not sufficient to motivate or enable 
spiritual life was Isaac Watts. Wesley agreed strongly enough with Watts' argument in 
this regard to abridge it and republish it for his Methodist people.' 
When Wesley's endorsement of Watts is combined with his lifelong commitment to 
an empiricist epistemology, the natural expectation is that he would have been dissatisfied 
with an intellectualist moral psychology, preferring the model which had a deep apprecia· 
tion for the contribution of the affections to human action. Such a preference is easy to 
demonstrate.'° More to the point, this preference was not simply a tangential concern for 
Wesley. It found central expression in his understanding of human nature, the human 
problem, and the Way of Salvation." 
Consider first his understanding of human nature. Wesley's typical list of faculties that 
constitute the Image of God in humanity included the understanding, the will, liberty, and 
conscience. In evaluating this list one must recognize that Wesley was not using "will" to 
designate a human faculty of rational self-determination, as is typical in current usage; 
rather, he specifically equated the will with the affectionS- And how did he conceive these 
affections? To begin with, they are not simply "feelings," they are the indispensable moti· 
vating inclinations behind all human action. On the other hand, they are neither mere 
intellectual assent nor blind attraction; rather, in their ideal expression, the affections inte· 
grate the rational and emotional dimensions of human life into a holistic inclination 
toward particular choices or acts. Finally, while provocative of human action, the affec· 
tions have a crucial receptive dimension as well. They are not self-causative, but are awak· 
ened and thrive in response to experience of external reality. In what Wesley held forth 
as the crucial instance, it is only in response to our experience of God's gracious love for us, 
shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, that the human affection of love for God 
and others is awakened and grows. 12 
While the affections are responsive, they need not be simply transitory. Wesley was 
clear that they can be habituated into enduring dispositions. Drawing on a characteristic 
eighteenth-century use of the term, he called such habituated dispositions "tempers." The 
major positive example of such a temper (or habituated affection) for Wesley was precise· 
ly love of God and neighbor. Indeed, he summarized holiness itself in terms of this tern· 
per. As he once put it, "From the true love of God and !other humans] directly flows 
every Christian grace, every holy and happy temper. And from these springs uniform 
holiness of conversation." 13 
Wesley's language of holy actions flowing from holy tempers suggests that he appreciated 
the sense in which habituated affections bring "freedom" for human actions-the freedom 
that comes from disciplined practice (e.g., the freedom to play a Bach concerto)." Yet, he 
was also aware that some contemporary thinkers (e.g., Hume) were presenting the influence 
of our affections on our actions as invincible, thereby undermining human freedom. To 
avoid such implications Wesley carefully distinguished "liberty" from will. He understood lib-
erty as our capacity to enact (or refuse to enact!) our desires and inclinations. This capacity is 
what allowed Wesley to appreciate the contributions of ha education, and argument to 
human willing, without rendering such willing totally determined. 
It is because our actions are not totally determined that Wesley took the issues of 
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human sin and salvation so seriously. The role of the affections was central to his under· 
standing of both of these topics. In the case of sin, Wesley insisted that the issue was more 
than individual wrong actions. He frequently discussed sin in terms of a three-fold divi· 
sion: sinful nature or tempers, sinful words, and sinful actions. The point of this division 
was that our sinful actions and words flow from corrupted tempers, so the problem of sin 
must ultimately be addressed at this affectional level. This point is also reflected in the 
way that the mature Wesley shifted his discussion of the classic Western doctrine of 
Original Sin away from questions of inherited guilt, focusing instead on the present disor· 
dering impact of Jnbeing Sin." While some have occasionally accused Wesley of viewing 
this lnbeing Sin as a foreign substance or entity that causes sinful actions, it was really 
more relational in character. The most basic cause of our present infirmity for Wesley was 
not some "thing" that we inherit, but the distortion of our nature resulting from being 
born into this world already separated from the empowering Divine Presence. Deprived of 
the effect of this essential relationship, our various faculties inevitably become debilitated, 
leaving us morally depraved. For one particular, our weakened affections take on unholy 
tempers. 
As a corollary of his understanding of our human problem, Wesley's chief complaint 
against the models of Christian salvation which he discerned among his fellow Anglican 
clergy was that they restricted themselves to outward matters, neglecting the affectional 
dimension of human life. His own typical definition of Christian life placed primary empha-
sis on renewing this inward dimension, described in such terms as: "the life of God in the 
[human) soul; a participation of the divine nature; the mind that was in Christ; or, the 
renewal of our heart after the image of [God who) created us."" Involved here would be 
both an awakening of the affections in response to the effect of God's gracious empower· 
ing Presence, and a shaping of those affections into holy dispositions (tempers). Since 
ness of thought, word, and action would flow from such renewal, Wesley once identified 
the essential goal of all true religion as the recovery of holy tempers." 
But how does this recovery take place7 How are our sin-debilitated affections reem-
powered and the sinful distortions of their patterning influence reshaped? Wesley was 
quite clear that we cannot accomplish this through our human efforts alone. Its possibility 
lies instead in the regenerating impact of God's graciously restored pardoning Presence in 
the lives of believers. Yet God's grace does not infuse holy tempers instantaneously com· 
plete. Rather, God awakens in believers the "seed" of every virtue." These seeds then 
strengthen and take shape as we responsively "grow in grace.'' 
It is crucial to note that Wesley assumed this growth would be a "cooperant" affair, 
because it is grounded in God's responsible grace, which both enables our ability to 
respond and respects our integrity in that response. This assumption is central to Wesley's 
recommended set of "means of grace." He valued the means of grace both as avenues by 
which God conveys the gracious Presence that enables our responsive growth in holiness 
and as "exercises" by which we responsibly nurture that holiness. Since holiness is rooted 
in the affections, he also highlighted the way in which various means of grace serve to 
enliven our affectional motivation and/or to shape our affectional disposition. Indeed, 
Wesley's developed set of recommended means of grace manifests a conscious concern 
to balance these two effects." 
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This leaves only the question of how far the recovery of holy tempers can be realized 
in this life Probably Wesley's most well-known claim is that eruire sanctification is a pre-
sent possibility for Christians. What exactly did he mean by this? Perhaps the best place to 
start an explanation is to make clear that entire sanctification (or Christian Perfection) is 
not an isolated reality, but a dynamic level of maturity within the larger process of sanctifi-
cation, the level characteristic of "adult" Christian life. We noted above that Wesley con-
sidered love to be the essence of Christian life. Thus, when he wanted to be more specif-
ic, he would define Christian Perfection as "the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and 
our neighbor, ruling our tempers, words, and actions."'° It is important to notice that love 
is not only said to be present, it is mling. God's love is shed abroad in the lives of all 
Christians, awakening their responsive love for God and others But this love is weak, spo-
radic, and offset by contrary affections in new believers. In the lives of the entirely sancti-
fied Wesley maintained that it rules "to the point that there is no mixture of any contrary 
affections-all is peace and harmony."" 
Affections contrary to love would be "inward sin." Wesley believed that this inward sin 
was overcome in entire sanctification. In a few instances he described this overcoming as 
a "rooting out" or "destruction" of inward sin. As he came to realize, this language is prob-
lematic, because talk of the destruction of sinful affections can connote the impossibility 
of their return. By Wesley became convinced of the sad reality that sinful affec-
tions (and resulting outward sins) may reemerge in lives that had been ruled by love. 
How could one express the benefits of Christian Perfection without obscuring this fact? 
When Wesley was pressed directly on this point he offered the alternative account that in 
the soul of an entirely sanctified person holy tempers are presently reigning to the point of 
"driving out" opposing tempers (although these may retum).22 
At this juncture, I must reemphasize that Wesley's focus on affections in describing 
Christian Perfection was not intended as an alternative to actions. He understood that acts 
of love flow from a temper of love. Yet, he also recognized that ignorance, mistakes, and 
other human frailties often distort the passage from affection to action. It was in this sense 
that he tired of the debate over whether Christian Perfection was "sinless." He did indeed 
believe that it consisted in holy tempers, but not that it was characterized by infallible 
expression of those tempers in actions. 
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley's affectional view of entire sanctification, then, 
is to say that he was convinced that the Christian life did not have to remain a life of per-
petual struggle. He believed that both Scripture and Christian tradition attested that God's 
loving grace can transform sinful human lives to the point where our own love for God 
and others becomes a free response. Christians can aspire to take on the disposition of 
Christ, and live out that disposition within the constraints of our human infirmities." To 
deny this possibility would be to deny the sufficiency of God's empowering grace-to 
make the power of sin greater than that of grace. 
II. EARLY AMERICAN REJECTION OF WESLEY'S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
If the preceding discussion has been successful in establishing a connection between 
Wesley's moral psychology and his characteristic emphases concerning entire sanctifica-
tion, it will provide good perspective for considering any clivergence of early American 
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Methodists from Wesley. One clear divergence is the broad rejection of Wesley's moral 
psychology among his American descendants. It would be helpful to place this rejection 
in historical context. 
During the latter half of the eighteenth century the empiricist emphasis on the role of 
the affections in human willing found some extreme formulations in British philosophy. 
The most notorious example was David Hume, who essentially reduced all human sense 
of moral obligation and inclination to functions of the physical passions. The deterministic 
implications of Hume's position called forth strong reactions-most notably, that of 
Thomas Reid. In an attempt to rebut Hume, Reid championed an account of duty and 
obligation that returned to an intellectualist moral psychology, with emphasis on rational 
control of the passions or affections.24 Central to his argument was the insistence that the 
psychological faculty of the will should not be identified with the affections, but was 
instead our free rational ability to choose between (or suppress) the various stimuli that 
motivate action. In this distinction, Reid removed rational intentionality from the affec-
tions, implying that they were actually irrational. Moreover, his maxim that only intendonal 
acts have moral status led him to depict habituated tendencies (tempers) as strictly 
amoral-if not indeed opposed to truly moral acts-since they operate with minimal con-
scious intentionality. 
The importance of Reid to our topic is the consistency with which his basic position 
was adopted in North American circles to critique theological expressions of a determinis-
tic affectional moral psychology. The leading target for such criticism was, of course, 
Jonathan Edwards. An affectional moral psychology was central to Edwards' Treadse 
Concerning Religious Affections ( 1746). His major purpose in this treatise was to defend the 
role of appeals to the affections in current revival efforts by arguing that the affections 
were integral to Christian life-as the "springs'' from which holy actions flow." It should 
not be surprising that John Wesley found this basic affectional psychology congenial 
enough to republish an abridged edition of Edwards' treatise for his Methodist people." 
This congeniality was heightened by the fact that the edition of this treatise that Wesley 
read and republished omitted the passages in Edwards' original edition that most explicitly 
characterized the holy affections as an "infused habitus," i.e., a gift from God that unilater-
ally represses evil affections and effects holy acts." Edwards' background conviction hint-
ed at in these omitted passages became central to his later essay on Freedom of the Will, 
where he argued that the will is not itself a real entity, but simply an expression of the 
strongest motive (affection) in a person's character. Thus a sinful human nature cannot 
desire to please God unless God-by a miraculous infusion of created grace (i.e., holy 
affections)-changes the sinners character." Edwards develops this point in extended con-
trast with Arminianism, arguing that the Arminian stress on human liberty results in a psy-
chology that cannot explain why we would ever make choices, and a moral philosophy 
that does not value virtuous habits and inclinations. In his posthumously published 
thoughts "Concerning Efficacious Grace" Edwards gave this the sharpest edge, repeatedly 
rejecting the (Wesleyan I) use of Philippians 2: 12-13 to teach cooperant grace." In a con-
cern to argue that God was solely responsible for our holiness and salvation, Edwards had 
to reject any notion that virtues are "habits" that are developed in a gradual and insensible 
way. He was not even content to say the Spirit infuses the potential for virtuous habits; 
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rather God infuses the fully-formed holy habits or disposition of the heart immediately. As 
a result, the change from being a vicious per.;on to having a virtuous character is instanta-
neous. 
Such a strong model of Divine grace operating unilaterally through the human will 
inevitably gave rise to debate, even within New England Calvinism.'° In their attempt to 
develop a more compatibilist model of Divine grace and human action, revisionary (or 
"New Divinity") Calvinists typically turned from Edwards to the intellectualist moral psychol-
ogy of Thomas Reid and his disciples." The theological voices among early American 
Methodists were drawn into this intra-Calvinist debate. They found themselves in an awk-
ward position. On the one hand, they criticized the New Divinity theologians as being 
inconsistent with their Reformed tradition. On the other hand, they insisted that both the 
New Divinity model and Edwards' model resulted in a determinism that undermined the 
moral integrity and love of God." Throughout, their treological concern was focused much 
more on how to avoid any infringements on human freedom in the ernotionaVintellectual 
dynamics of spiritual life than on Wesley's focal issue of how to awaken affectional commit-
ment in per.;ons who were already conventional <i.e., merely intellectual) Christians. 
The crucial thing to note, for our purposes, is that these American Methodist theolo-
gians also appropriated Reid's intellectualist psychology to articulate their alternative 
model of the dynamics of spiritual life. 33 This move took nearly "official" status with the 
publication of excerpts from two prominent expositor.; of Reid's moral psychology in the 
first volume of the Methodist Review ( 18 18), and the release of an American edition of 
Reid's Work<from the Methodist publisher.; in 1822." 
There is no better indicator of the extent of this appropriation of Reid's moral psychol-
ogy than the consistency with which these early American Methodist theologians distin-
guished the affections from the will, and defined the latter as the principle of independent 
rational choice. 35 In place of Wesley's enumeration of our psychological faculties as under-
standing, will, liberty, and conscience, the typical American Methodist list became that of 
Reid: understanding, affections (or sensibilities), and will."' In further consonance with 
Reid, these American theologians demonstrated a tendency to portray the affections as 
inherently irrational, needing regulation by the more primary human faculty of under-
standing." Likewise, they typically judged habits and inclinations to have moral status only 
when voluntarily embraced, and were prone to evaluate them more as obstacles to-than 
as facilitator.; of-free action.'8 
It must be admitted that these changes from Wesley appear to have taken place with 
little initial consciousness of the fact. The fir.;t instance that I have found where debate 
erupted over how Wesley's faculty psychology might relate to that assumed in American 
Methodist dialogue was in 1842'" And it was 1888 before there was the clear conces-
sion that Wesley identified the will with the affections, while contemporary American 
Methodist theologians did not. However, this was assumed to be only a semantic differ-
had taught contemporary theologians to use "will" to designate what Wesley 
called "liberty."'" 
Ill. IMPUCA TIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CHRISTIAN PERFECTION 
In reality, the difference between Wesley and Reid (or Wesley and Kant!) was more 
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than a matter of semantics. It involved alternative emphases concerning the role of the 
affections in processes of human choice and action. As such, it was inevitable that the 
switch in moral psychology that we have traced in early American Methodism would 
have effects on their appropriation of Wesley's "affectionar understanding of Christian 
Perfection. It is time to tum our attention to these effects. 
A. Impact Through Mid-Nineteenth Century 
The fortunes of Wesley's understanding of entire sanctification during the initial genera-
tion of American Methodism (J 772-1816, the tenure of Francis Asbury's ministry) can be 
summarized in several generaliz.ations. First, even if their preoccupation was with calling sin-
ners to conversion, the concern for holiness of heart and life pervaded the preaching of the 
early Methodist itinerants." Second, the status of early Methodism as a countercultural 
movement within the dominant "culture of honor and deference" in the surrounding society 
fostered a social coherence that minimalized doctrinal debate." Third, the most defining 
influence on early American Methodism was actually Asbury, but his characteristic 
emphases on sanctification reflected the "mature" balance of Wesley, valuing preaching the 
possibility of entire sanctification as much for how it fosters present growth in holy affections 
as for any actual attainment." Yet, fourth, Asbury could also affirm proclaiming Christian 
Perfection because of the way it distracted the early Methodists from contending for the 
right of their (unordained) preachers to serve eucharist!" In this evaluation one senses that 
the central role of the means of grace to Wesley's understanding of sanctification was begin-
ning to slip among his American descendants. 
The role of the means of grace would be further diminished in the years following 
Asbury's death, as the impact of the switch to an intellectualist moral psychology spread 
among American Methodists. This impact might seem hard to discern, since nineteenth-
century American Methodism remained heavily dependent upon British treatments of 
Christian Perfection through mid-century." However, there was a noticeable increase of 
influence of British voices other than Wesley-and in some tension with Wesley-as this 
period progressed, an increase that can be correlated with the shifting moral psychology 
traced above. 
The first case to consider is John Fletcher. As one of Wesley's closest coworkers, 
Fletcher imbibed and echoed many of Wesley's major themes. In particular, he strongly 
endorsed the point that the goal of sanctification (Christian Perfection) is not merely a 
deliverance from the power of sin, but most properly a recovery of the holy tempers." At 
the same time, Fletcher was more defined by controversial dialogue with the Calvinists 
than Wesley. As a result, in his attempt to counter Edwards' deterministic equation of 
affections with the will Fletcher moved toward identifying the will as the power of ratio-
nal self-determination, and emphasized that true freedom comes from rationally control-
ling the affections, appetites, and passions." When this move is combined with Fletcher's 
association (in direct contrast to Wesley) of the entrance into Christian Perfection with the 
"baptism of the Holy Spirit," the frameworl< was laid for a model of entire sanctification 
focused largely in one volitional event." While Fletcher himself continued to affirm the 
importance of growth throughout the Christian life, he could also advise believers not to 
"wait idly'' in the means of grace for the perfecting worl< of God, but to "take it by force" 
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in prayer." This latter advice found a growing audience among American Methodists in 
the nineteenth century.'° By mid-century it could vie for authority with Wesley's own 
treatments. 51 
Another British voice that gained an increased hearing by mid-century was Adam 
Oarke." Oarke's somewhat ambiguous position further heightened the contrast with 
Wesley's affectional model of sanctification. To begin with, Oarke was even more explicit 
than Fletcher in equating the will with liberty. 53 At the same time, he described both sin 
and holiness in nearly deterministic terms: as long as unholy affections were present in 
our life we cannot live truly holy lives; but once God fills us with holy tempers such lives 
will flow forth naturally. Most importantly, both the destruction of the unholy tempers 
and the filling with holy tempers were presented as Gocf s unilateral and instantaneous 
acts (reminiscent of Edwards!l. Oarke strongly rejected any notion of gradual purification 
from unholy tempers." The result was a model of Christian Perfection as instantaneous 
purification, with little or no role of "character formation" in overcoming vice, though it 
may play some role in developing the implanted seeds of virtue. 
The major tendencies we have been noting continued (though with some moderation) 
in our other major British voice, Richard Watson. Watson is of particular importance to our 
story because his Theological Institutes became the standard text in American Methodist theo-
logical education for the middle five decades of the nineteenth century. As such, it is signifi-
cant that Watson clearly turned to an intellectualist moral psychology (apparently drawing 
on Reid) to critique Edwards' model of Christian life." Given his dependance upon Wesley, 
Watson did keep affection language in his descriptions of sanctification. But, like Oarke, he 
portrayed the deliverance from all unholy affections and the introduction of the seeds of 
holy affections as an instantaneous event." At the same time, Watson stressed more than 
Oarke the necessary development of holy habits and virtues that must follow this event, and 
could talk of the period between regeneration and entire sanctification as "advancing" 
toward this event" While this would seem to keep Watson more in line with Wesley's 
model of how holy character is developed, it must be balanced by the recognition that 
Watson's intellectualist psychology also led him to evaluate the means of grace primarily in 
terms of "duty." For example, he treats the sacraments of baptism and Lorcf s Supper as signs 
that confirm (but do not convey!l God's grace, and argues in specific relation to prayer that 
it is not an instrument of grace but a "condition" of grace. 58 As such, his warning about miss-
ing the Lorcf s Supper habitually is not that one loses its empowering and formative benefits, 
but only that it is a violation of Christ's plain command." 
To test the extent to which these additional British voices were congruent with (and 
influential on) American Methodism in the first half of the nineteenth century, we need 
only note characteristic emphases of those American writers who addressed Christian 
Perfection in this period. First, the Americans clearly use the intellectualist moral psychoh 
gy of the will controlling the affections as the interpretive framework for discussing 
Christian Perfection."° Second, there is a growing openness among the American writers to 
identification of entire sanctification with the baptism of the Holy Spirit, and portrayal of 
this event as a time when evil affections are instantly removed and holy tempers instilled.61 
Third, given this more instantaneous focus, if means of grace are mentioned, it is often only 
a call to attend preaching on entire sanctification and to pray earnestly for it 62 Even when 
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the broader set of means of grace are invoked, it is more in terms of duties than as forma-
tive disciplines.61 In light of this reconception, the noticeable decline in the use of means of 
grace among Methodists through the nineteenth-century is less surprising." 
As this summaty demonstrates, differences were developing in nineteenth-centuty 
American Methodism with central assumptions of Wesley's understanding of Christian 
Perfection. These differences would spark open debates in the second half of the century. 
I will consider the debates in the Northern and Southern churches separately. In each 
case my main concern is not to give an exhaustive survey, but to suggest how the change 
in moral psychology that we have been tracing contributed to them.65 
B. Debates over Christian Perfection in Northern Methodism, 185 0--1900 
American debate over the authentic "Wesleyan" understanding of entire sanctification 
broke out first in the Northern church. Importantly, the majority of participants on all 
sides of this debate accepted an intellectualist moral psychology as self-evident, differing 
only on its implications for Christian Perfection. Such dominance by the intellectualist psy-
chology is not hard to explain. It continued to be used in influential apologetic responses 
against the Calvinists." It was the perspective defended in the texts on moral philosophy 
placed on the required Course of Study for traveling elders." And it remained central to 
discussions of anthropology in standard Methodist systematic theologies." 
The first shots in the Northern debate actually began their flight from outside. In 1839 
Asa Mahan (a Congregationalist) published a defense of Christian Perfection articulated 
rigorously within the assumptions of the intellectualist moral psychology of Thomas 
Reid." On these terms, perfection became the full and perfect voluntary discharge of our 
rational duty to God and all other beings! More specifically, it was the ever vigilant use of 
our will to impose rational control on our passions, appetites, and propensities, so that our 
every choice might be freed for obedience to God's command.'° When it was protested 
that such an ideal was impossible, Mahan responded that it becomes possible when 
Christians accept (subsequent to justification) the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, for this bap-
tism strengthens their rational self-control." 
At first glance the gap between Mahan's understanding of Christian Perfection and 
that of Wesley would seem unbridgeable. Holiness is no longer a matter of the graciously 
empowered and guided progressive transformation of our affectional nature into the 
holistic disposition of Christ, it is the simple maintenance (with some help by the Holy 
Spirit) of an ongoing series of ·'free" (i.e., regardless of inner inclinations) rational choices 
to fulfill our duties. The only means of grace central to the latter model would be ones 
that are conditions of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, or that exhort us regularly concern-
ing our duty-e.g., sermon, Scripture reading, and prayer. 
Despite these differences, Mahan's model of Christian Perfection proved congenial to 
many Methodists.72 Surely its most enthusiastic appropriation was in the writings of 
Phoebe Palmer. While Palmer "lowered the standard" of our duty to the single matter of 
total surrender or devotion to God, she kept Mahan's emphasis that such devotion is pos-
sible by a perpetual rational exercise of will.n The congruence of Palmer's model of holi-
ness with Reid's intellectualist psychology is best evidenced by its appropriation in 
Thomas Upham, who had become a leading exponent of this psychology." 
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The strong intellectualism of Upham' s model of Christian Perfection is most clear in his 
claim that those entirely sanctified would experience temptation only "theoretically," not 
sensibly. This claim sparked a prolonged rejoinder from Merritt Caldwell, explicitly based 
on disagreement over spiritual/moral psychology." Caldwell took it as obvious that no 
Christian reaches the point of not being occasionally "sensibly" tempted or inclined to sin-
ful acts. But drawing on the Reidian tradition of moral psychology, he argued that such 
inclinations, tempers, passions, or affections are only natural "feelings" and have no moral 
status. As such, one can indeed be delivered from all sin and still feel these temptations. 
Caldwells attempt to correct Upham served to ignite debate over the natute and pos-
sibility of Christian Perfection in the Northern church. On one side of this debate were 
those who insisted against Caldwell that inward inclinations to sinful acts were indeed of 
moral character-they are the "evil constitutional principle" of Original Sin that remains in 
believers following justification." On this reading, the very purpose of entire sanctification 
became the eradication of this constitutional principle. Importantly, those who developed 
this reading were heavily influenced by Fletcher and Oarke. As such, they connected 
entire sanctification to the dramatic event of the Baptism of the Holy Spiri' and argued 
that in this event all unholy inclinations are instantaneously destroyed and (at least the 
seeds oil holy inclinations instilled." 
Pattisans to this position understood themselves to be defending 'Wesleyan" Holiness. 
But while they were indeed defending the possibility of entire sanctification, their depen-
dance upon an intellectualist moral psychology led them to a very different understanding of 
its nature than Wesley." This is most evident in their discomfort with any emphasis on the 
role of discipline and nurture in "untwisting'' our sinful inclinations. They insisted that all such 
efforts are fruitless, that the constitutional principle of evil can only be removed unilaterally 
by God, and that any role for nurture or growth would only come after this had taken 
place. On these terms, Christian Perfection is distinguished sharply from character forma-
tion-a distinction they drew by contrasting "purity'' and "maturity" in the Christian life." 
Christian Perfection, for them, was a state of simple purity entered instantaneously when all 
evil inclinations are destroyed. Maturity awaited subsequent growth in the holy virtues. Not 
only is this quite different from Wesley's identification of Christian Perfection with the full 
"disposition" of they typically give little guidance on how subsequent growth in char-
acter is nurtured (often portraying it as inevitable). While they championed the holiness 
meeting as a means to the crisis experience of entire sanctification, one finds little emphasis 
on formative means of grace or discipline.80 At times it appeared that their interest lay more 
in determining just which "imperfections" could remain in a person who was pure. Given 
their moral psychology, arguments over this issue focused on actions and frequently degen-
erated into legalistic moralism. 
1 hasten to add that those reacting to this overall model of entire sanctification could 
be just as moralistic. These reactions were patticularly concerned to deny that Christians 
must await a second work of grace before they can be expected to live holy lives. As one 
example put it, 'The Christian may, and is required by God, to be perfect every day of his 
life in the sense of keeping the whole moral law as the fruit of his [or her] regeneration."" 
Given the terms in which the holiness camp had framed the argumen' these writers 
ended up arguing that the liberating and empowering benefits of sanctification all come in 
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our initial regeneration." This allowed (some otl them to emphasize the process of grow-
ing in grace after regeneration, and to highlight the contribution of the means of grace to 
such growth. But what was the character of this growth? They insisted against the holiness 
camp that nothing in the believer's "nature" needed fundamental change, in order for free 
obedience to be possible. Yet they were also clear that believers struggle to control temp-
tation or inclinations to sinful acts. Their main concern was to maintain (echoing the argu-
ment, and intellectualist psychology, of Caldwell) that these inclinations should not be 
seen as having moral status, or subject to salvific transfonnation. If Wesley had disagreed 
on this point, it was because of his inadequate psychology!" And if there was any sense in 
which Christian Perfection is a distinct state in the process of sanctification, it is only in the 
heightened ability that practice brings to repress our lower (affectionaD nature and live in 
unreserved rational consecration to God.64 
It is hard to imagine how such strongly contrasting readings could be reconciled, 
though there were some valiant efforts to do so." I would suggest that the major reason 
these efforts failed is that they continued to assume the intellectualist moral psychology.86 
It strikes me as no accident that, operating within this psychology, leading theologians of 
the nineteenth-century Methodist Episcopal Church were often reduced to admitting that 
they simply could not explain the dynamics of entire sanctification!" Nor is it surprising 
that folk who were confident of their ability to explain these dynamics (in "holiness" 
terms) increasingly found themselves in new denominational contexts. 
C. Debates over Christian Perfection in Southern Methodism, 185 0-1900 
Vigorous debate over Christian Perfection in the Methodist Episcopal Church South 
came a generation later than in the North, and largely echoed the earlier Northern 
debates. One of the clear similarities is that it was again fought against the background of 
an assumed inte!lectualist moral psychology. The particular prominence of this psychology 
in Southern Methodism can be attributed to one man-Albert Bledsoe. Bledsoe was a 
convert to Methodism from Congregationalism, and his conversion had come through a 
detailed critique of Edwards' affectional psychology. His standard in this critique was the 
intellectualist psychology of Thomas Reid.88 Thus, it is no accident that the same psycholo-
gy is represented in the moral philosophy texts on the course of study for the Southern 
church.89 
From its beginnings through the mid- I 880s, the "holiness" reading we encountered in 
the Northern church appears to have enjoyed quiet privilege in the Methodist Episcopal 
Church South.90 The quiet was shattered when Jeremiah Boland published a feisty cri-
tique of this reading in 1887." His points basically repeat those of the Northern critics: 
regeneration brings all the purification of our nature necessary for enabling growth in holi-
ness; there is no residue of Original Sin remaining in believers; the inclinations to sin that 
remain in believers are natural and have no moral culpability; and Christian Perfection is 
simply the consistent obedient free exercise of our wills that comes with maturity. If there 
is anything new in Boland, it is the clarity with which he grounds his position in an intel-
lectualist psychology, and criticizes Wesley for the inadequacy of his alternative psycholo-
gy (calling it a "blot on our Anninian Methodism'")." 
As one might expect, Boland's argument called forth a string of defenses of the 
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ness" claim that Christian Petfection marks the eradication of evil inclinations remaining in 
believers-arguing that it was the biblical position, the position confirmed by experience, 
Wesley's position, and the "standard" position of the Methodist Episcopal Church South.93 
A more unique response to Boland was offered by George Hayes, who argued that the 
debate could be solved by modifying the claims of both sides. Against Boland, Hayes insist-
ed that an inherited depravity remains in believers which is not simply "natural"; while 
against the eradicationists, he argued that this depravity is not sin in itself and will never be 
removed in this life. Holiness then becomes a process (made possible by regeneration and 
discipline) of increasing our abtlity to resist this depravity through strengthening of our char-
acter, and Christian Petfection the mature establishment of that character." While this 
sounds a little closer to Wesley, it does not take long to see that Hayes views character in 
intellectual terms alone, defining it as "doing the best we know.'" 
This is particularly disappointing, because there were at least a few in the Southern 
church who were uncomfortable with the reigning intellectualist psychology and struggled 
to articulate an alternative in connection with the nature of holiness." Overall, such voices 
were rare. More common were protests about the way that some were reducing holiness 
to "mere emotionalism," protests that often carried themselves the tone of legalistic moral-
ism." Against this background, the truly surprising thing is that Southern irenic attempts to 
mediate between competing groups were somewhat more successful than in the North." 
D. Twentieth-Century Developments? 
The next logical step would be to carry our story on through the twentieth century. 
But there is actually very little to tell! To borrow an image that I believe Albert Outler first 
used, Christian Petfection, which was a cornerstone of Wesley's theology, had become by 
the twentieth century an annoying pebble in the shoe of American Methodism. While a 
few sought to remove it, most studiously ignored it as they limped along. In part this was 
due to exhaustion with the infighting that we have been tracing. But it also reflected the 
fact that none of the competing sides had been able to articulate a compelling model of 
the dynamics of sanctification and the ideal of Christian Petfection 
I have argued that a major obstacle to the nineteenth-century attempts to retrieve 
Wesley's understanding of Christian Petfection was the intellectualist moral psychology that 
they all assumed. If this was indeed the case, then we can understand why the notion of 
Christian Petfection became even less conceivable or attractive to American Methodists in 
the twentieth century. It is true that by the tum of the century the influence of Reid's philo-
sophical and moral tradition was fading. But it was widely replaced by neo-Kantian assump-
tions that were as intellectualist in their moral psychology as Reid had ever been. If anything, 
the new trends heightened the "decisionistic" aspect of this psychology-locating moral value 
in the independence of each choice from any personal inclinations or desires. Such neo-
Kantian assumptions were particularly prevalent in Methodist theology, due to the dorlli-
nance of Boston Personalism in these circles. A leading theme of this school of thought was 
the need to rationalize religion by purifying it of all mystical and ceremonial overlays." Thus, 
it should be no surprise that they found Wesley's conception of Christian Petfection difficult 
to appreciate, or that they (and most others) offer in its place largely an emphasis on rational 
control of our emotions and fu1fillment of our duty to God and others."'' 
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N. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
Such is the American Methodist saga with the notion of Christian Perfection. What 
lessons might we learn from the journey 7 I would suggest that the first lesson is simply to 
recognize how integrally connected models of spirituality are to assumptions about moral 
psychology. We cannot presume that every model can be convincingly translated into dif-
ferent sets of assumptions. Likewise, we cannot presume that every set of assumptions 
about moral psychology is equally adequate for understanding spiritual life or models of 
its development. 
A second lesson is the insight that this case-study provides into some of the characteris-
tics that an inteliectualist moral psychology imposes on conceptions of spiritual life. For 
example, emotions or affections enter'into such a spirituality primarily as adversaries to 
overcome or hindrances to be controlled. Likewise, spiritual victory becomes a result 
either of increased rational competence cultivated by careful discipline, or of a decisive 
purgative event. Either option creates significant tensions concerning Divine/human inter-
action in salvation. On the first account, Divine grace may be affirmed as the source of 
our power, but the accent is on what we do with it. On the second account, there is typi-
cally the suggestion of a requisite act on our part before God's gracious purgative work in 
our lives, and an emphasis on our obligation to "retain" the blessing. Thus, both accounts 
are open to a subtle Pelagianism and to degenerating into legalistic moralism. This is 
because neither has a compelling answer to what attracts or inclines us toward obedient 
response. 
This leads to my third lesson, which is that a recovered appreciation for the role of 
habit and character in action is not necessarily a sufficient response to the limits of the 
"decisionistic" model of morality and spirituality prevalent in the Western world. We 
encountered more than enough examples to know that an emphasis on character can be 
constructed within the constraints of the intellectualist model-conceiving character as the 
strengthening of a rational tendency through repetition and modeling. But such a model 
would still lack an appreciation for the affective dimension of inclination. 101 
I am convinced that the fourth lesson the history of American Methodist discussion of 
Christian Perfection should teach us is the necessity of recovering a positive appreciation 
for the affectional dimension of human life and spirituality. I use the word "affection" here 
purposefully in an attempt to retain a connection between two emphases that are some-
times separated in terms of emotions and passions. Emotions are often construed with 
primary emphasis on their motivating role as inclinations to action. 102 The defining charac-
teristic of passions, by contrast, is their receptive nature, responding to external stimuli or 
agents. While an intellectualist model would see such receptivity in negative terms as loss 
of control, it can be seen instead as a positive trait-allowing the person to be responsively 
empowered and shaped (for example, by encounter with God's gracious Presence).'m On 
this reading, emotions and passions would be inherently intertwined, for our motivating 
inclinations would be grounded in and shaped by responsive interaction with God and 
others. 
This leads me to a final lesson: an increased appreciation for the affectional dimension 
of spiritual life is necessarily connected to a recognition of the contribution of the full range 
of the means of grace in empowering and shaping our affections. This connection was suf-
•••>< '""'"' ,,,. ____ .. 
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ficiently demonstrated Gn reverse) in the history of American Methodism; as an intellecttr 
alist model of spirituality took over, Wesley's reconunended pattern of means of grace was 
progressively trimmed down to those that address folk intellectually-e.g., Word, sermon, 
and prayer. 
All of this leads me to say that American Methodists will only begin to understand 
anew what Wesley meant by Christian Perfection as they sense the limitations of the 
intellectualist models of human action that surround them and recover Wesley's apprecia-
tion for the affections and the means of grace. If this ever happens, then they will find 
that Wesley meant something very much like Benedict, in his description of a monk who 
has ascended the steps of discipline in humility: 
The monk will quickly arrive at that perfect love of God which casts out fear. 
Through this love, all that he once performed with dread, he will now begin to 
observe without effort, as though naturally, from habit, no longer out of fear of hell, 
but out of love for Christ, good habit and delight in virtue. All this the Lord will by 
the Holy Spirit graciously manifest in his workman now cleansed of vices and sins."" 
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